Individuals' Voting Choice and Cooperation in Repeated Social Dilemma Games

In this paper we explore the relationship between the individual’s preference for cooperation and the establishment of cooperative norms. Our aim is to provide an experimental test of the evolutionary hypothesis (see Carpenter, 2004, Fehr and Gachter 2002; Gintis 2000; Boyd, Bowles, Gintis and Richerson 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2004), according to which individuals are prepared to punish defectors in experimental social dilemma games because they want to enforce a social (“altruistic”) norm which may conduce to increasing their future payoffs, as in the case of sanctions against free riding behaviour. According to this line of research , the high levels of cooperation we observe in our societies can, therefore, be strictly related to the establishment of social norms which are able to enforce and maintain cooperation in the long run. We study the results of two experiments in which the individuals decided both whether to participate in a common project and the institutional rule according to which the profits of the project had to be shared among each of the participants in the group. They could choose between 1) a regime where gains were shared equally, regardless of individuals’ contributions and without sanctions and rewards (System A); 2) a regime where individuals were paid according to their marginal contribution, but the profits of the investments were lower than in the other contexts (System B); finally 3) a regime in which gains were shared equally (as in System A), but individuals were allowed to punish (and\or reward) free riding (cooperative) behaviours as in Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007). Before the experiments took place, our subjects were required to fill a questionnaire composed of four sections, where their attitude to cooperate and their opinions on civic values and free riding behaviours were thoroughly explored. We then monitored the behaviour of potential free riders and cooperators in the game and their institutional choices. Our results partly contradict the evolutionary hypothesis in as much as System A and B received the largest shares of votes in almost all rounds and they were voted by free riders and cooperators alike. Thus, most individuals do not like sanctions (incentives) against defectors and free riders (cooperators), and their institutional preferences do not seem to be related to their willingness to cooperate. The inspection of individual data, however, reveals some interesting points. In fact, we can assert that System C was mostly chosen by cooperative individuals in response to observed free riding behaviour. Furthermore, when a cooperative individual chose C, she would tend to punish free riders and reward cooperators. Our conclusion is that, as far as the institutional choices are concerned, beside the profit motivations underlined in the evolutionary hypothesis, the ethical and cultural unobserved individual preferences play an important role. There is a number of individuals (limited in our experiments, ranging between 15 and 30 per cent of the entire population) who see cooperation as the “right” thing to do, and therefore are prepared to implement institutional rules that may favour this collective outcome. Most people in our experiments did not share these same values.public good games, experiments, voting choices

Preference Heterogeneity in Relation to Museum Services

The prevailing trends in the management of European museums underline the importance of additional museum services in fostering and encouraging the optimisation of cultural assets, while facilitating the collection of the necessary resources for conservation. The paper considers the case of the archaeological site of Paestum (Salerno) and presents an analysis of individual preferences in relation to specific policies of cultural heritage management, each characterised by the supply of different museum services. Since the diversity of these services can prompt different individual preferences, the analysis allows for heterogeneity of parameters among individuals.cultural goods; heterogeneous preferences; stated preference data; conjoint analysis; mixed logit;

Social Preferences and the Third Sector: Looking for a Microeconomic Foundation of the Local Development Path

The aim of the paper is to endorse the principle, recurrent in non-profit literature, that the third sector is an institution that supports the development process of economic systems. The third sector is considered as an institution that âÃÂÃÂfavors, transmits and cementsâÃÂàthe role of social preferences in a given economy and, in this way, it contributes to development. The paper thus considers two stances taken up in economic theory: (i) the theory of social preferences; (ii) the modern theory of development. These two stances do not exclusively and specifically refer to the third sector, and they generally follow parallel paths, rarely being aware of each other: in the paper, the third sector is assumed to form a bridge between them in that social preferences are supposed to be one of the driving forces in the change process of an economy.endogenous social preferences; third sector; local development

Eliciting Public Preferences For Managing Cultural Heritage

This paper reports results from a survey using conjoint choice approach questions to elicit people’s preferences for cultural heritage management strategies for an outstanding world heritage site: the Temples of Paestum, in Italy. The potential of the above-mentioned methodologies’ within the current cultural heritage research scenario is also discussed.Conjoint Analyis, Evaluation of Cultural Goods

Eliciting Public Preferences For Managing Cultural Heritage Sites: Evidence from a Case study on the Temples Of Paestum

This paper discusses ways of improving the management of cultural heritage sites and cities, focusing on new forms of involvement and public participation based on public preferences’ elicitation. The problem of city governance and of the appropriate level of democratic participation needs an integrated approach, capable of bridging the practice of urban design, conservation of the built environment and decision-making support system. This paper reports results from a survey using conjoint choice approach questions to elicit people’s preferences for cultural heritage management strategies for an outstanding world heritage site: the Temples of Paestum, in Italy. The potential of the above-mentioned methodologies’ within the current cultural heritage research scenario is also discussed.

Body Weight and Gender: Academic Choice and Performance

This study examines the relationship between body weight and academic choice and performance, focusing on gender differences and using survey data from students at the University of Salerno in Italy.Our findings indicate a significant negative relationship between body weight and academic performance,particularly for female students.In our examination of BMI and field of study (i.e.,science vs.the humanities),our results indicate that overweight/obese females are less likely than those of average weight to pursue scientific studies, and hence, more remunerative careers.The asymmetry of the findings between males and females suggests that during late adolescence physicality plays different roles according to gender

Body Weight and Gender: Academic Choice and Performance

This study examines the relationship between body weight and academic choice and performance, focusing on gender differences and using survey data from students at the University of Salerno in Italy.Our findings indicate a significant negative relationship between body weight and academic performance,particularly for female students.In our examination of BMI and field of study (i.e.,science vs.the humanities),our results indicate that overweight/obese females are less likely than those of average weight to pursue scientific studies, and hence, more remunerative careers.The asymmetry of the findings between males and females suggests that during late adolescence physicality plays different roles according to gender

Cooperative credit banks: some fundamental institutional features

The aim of this paper is to analyze individual preferences in relation to different job characteristics. This is an important issue in the light of the huge literature in labor economics and human resource management about the impact of monetary and nonmonetary incentives on understanding workers’ performance and well-being. More specifically, this work considers the case of employees in cooperative credit banks located in Campania; the research is carried out applying a conjoint analysis approach on stated preference data. Novel features of the analysis include the application of this approach to empirical research on worker incentives, particularly in the cooperative sector; and the utilization of a mixed logit model to allow for heterogeneous individual tastes

Workers’ motivation: the italian case of cooperative credit banks

The role of the cooperative credit banks in the European financial system is growing, particularly during the current period of financial crisis. Nevertheless, these cooperative banks have not received a great deal of attention from scholars. This lack of attention has resulted from two factors: i) the lack of empirical data and ii) the fact that the organizational structures and multiple goals of these cooperative banks are “generally more difficult to understand than the corporate governance of the commercial banks with their more easily interpretable and single goal of profit maximizing”(Groeneveld, 2011). This paper contributes to the understanding of Italian cooperative credit banks (Bccs) and their activity by describing their main characteristics and by providing a comparison with different cooperative bank models. Second, it analyzes the job satisfaction of Italian Bccs’ employees, which is a crucial factor because human resources, along with the Bccs’ unique structural elements, facilitate long-term relationships with the local communities where Bccs are located